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《心理学探新》[ISSN:1003-5184/CN:36-1228/B]

期数:

 2007年27卷02期

页码:

 32

栏目:

 认知心理学

出版日期:

 2007-06-20

文章信息/Info

Title:

 Effects of Different Probability Representation on Bayesian Reasoning

作者:

 杨 莉 胡竹菁

 江西师范大学心理学系，南昌330022

Author(s):

 Yang Li Hu Zhujing

 Institute of Education ，Jiangxi Normal University，Nanchang 330022

关键词:

 贝叶斯推理; 概率表征; 推理策略

Keywords:

 Bayesian reasoning ; probability representation; strategy of reasoning 5 3

分类号:

 B842.5

DOI:

 -

文献标识码:

 A

摘要:

 该研究以贝叶斯推算、判断为实验任务，探讨了三种概率表征（百分比、自然频率、概 率词）、三种概率规则认识水平对贝叶斯推理的影响，结果表明：1）概率词表征的贝叶斯推算实质 是判断过程。2）在三种概率表征中，频率表征更适合于正确完成贝叶斯推理，但存在学科背景的 差异。3）贝叶斯推理使用的策略有正确规则、错误规则、命题知识、概率简捷式、直觉和个人意愿 六种。4）贝叶斯判断的正确率高于贝叶斯推算，个体在贝叶斯判断上使用的正确规则多于贝叶斯 推算过程。

Abstract:

 The reasoning tasks were Bayesian calculation andjudgment to explore the effects of different probabilityrepresentation，understand— ing probability rule onthe Bayesianinference ．The results showed ：1）Process of verbal probability format on Bayesian reasoning was judg— ment ．2）Frequencyformat was better than other formats ，but there was difference among participants of different subject ．3）Strategies of Bayesian reasoning included right rule ，error rule ，proposition，probability heuristics ，intuition，desire ．4）Judgment was better than calcula— tion，right rules ofjudgment were more than of calculation．

参考文献/References

 1 Edwards W．Conservatismin humaninformation processing ．In：B Kleinmuntz，Ed ．Formal representation of human judgment ．New York：Wiley，1968．17－52．
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3 Tversky A，Kahneman D．Evidential i mpact of base rates ．In：D Kahneman，D．P．Slovic ，A．Tversky，Eds ．Judgment under uncer— tainty：Heuristics and biases ．Cambridge ，England ：Cambridge U— niversity Press ，1982．153－160．
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7 Sloman SA．The empirical case fortwo systems ofreasoning ．In： T．Gilovich，et al ．，eds ．Heuristics and Biases ：The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment ，Cambridge University Press ，2002．397－ 398．
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更新日期/Last Update:  2009-01-17